rather than groups, are the parties involved) be The topic of affect has been described as an im-grouped in two categories: (a) the relatively fixed situaportant, but underexplored area of the social psychol-tional context within which negotiation takes place and ogy of negotiation. In this paper we seek to advance (b) the thoughts, plans, and actions of the individual thinking about affective processes in two-party negoti-negotiators themselves. (Baron, 1993, p. 82). Negotiation, as a process nomic and social-cognitive outcomes, and proclivity to comply with settlement terms. We develop specific of social interaction and exchange, is a natural arena research propositions that describe these influences for the observation and analysis of affective influences. and discuss their implications for broader questions Bierhoff (1988, p. 167) remarked that ''a theory of interabout the role of affect in bargaining. ᭧ 1996 Academic personal behavior is incomplete without inclusion of Press, Inc.
THE IMPORTANCE OF AFFECT
known as mood, is pervasive, of lower intensity, and arises with less of an identifiable antecedent cause Affect refers broadly to feelings, moods, or emotional (Forgas, 1992) . Moods, although regarded as relatively states that individuals experience, sometimes, but not enduring compared to emotions, are nevertheless inalways, in response to situations and circumstances constant states that may be experienced multiple times (Park, Sims, & Motowidlo, 1986) . At a basic dimen-in the course of a typical day (Baron, 1993) . sional level of analysis, affect can be said to vary in A different approach is taken by researchers who intensity or level of activation, from strong to weak, treat affect in terms of ongoing social perceptions havand to vary in valence, or ''tone,'' between positive and ing positive or negative values; a common example is negative (Batson, 1990; Russell, 1979) . Positive affect interpersonal liking (Druckman & Broome, 1991 ; Lodescribes the experience of rewarding or pleasant wenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989 ; Tsui & Barry, moods or emotions, while negative affect describes the 1986). Positive affect is said to exist within social situaexperience of discomforting or unpleasant moods or tions where interacting parties have a personal relaemotions. Although it is intuitively tempting to attrib-tionship characterized by friendship, intimacy, trust, ute a kind of conceptual symmetry to positive and nega-closeness, or a congenial interaction style. Negative aftive affect, the reality is that empirically observed con-fect, in contrast, is manifest with distrust, acrimony, sequences in social settings are more consistent for pos-vengeance, loathing, and hostility. Although researchitive affect than for negative affect (Isen & Baron, 1991 ; ers who adopt this perspective define affect in terms Moore & Isen, 1990 ). The reason is that negative affect of the quality of social or relational behavior, these has a greater dimensionality, a more complex struc-qualities perhaps are more appropriately regarded as ture, and a greater variety of sources than does positive sources of affect, rather than affect itself. There is very affect (Izard, 1991; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989 ; Tay-little published research that explicitly investigates aflor, 1991; Watson & Clark, 1984 . In evolutionary fective processes in negotiation; however, there is a terms, the ability to recognize negative affect in one's recent and growing interest among negotiation reaggressor and the ability to effect negative affect to searchers in relationship issues (e.g., Greenhalgh & marshall readiness and strength were key to survival. Chapman, 1995; Halpern, 1992; King & Hinson, 1994;  In contrast, positive affect was key to joy and serenity Sondak & Moore, 1993; Valley, Neale, & Mannix, and had fewer survival implications. 1995) . While a detailed analysis of relationship dynamBecause of the greater volume of literature on the ics is beyond the scope of this paper, we will discuss social psychological aspects of positive affect germane relationship issues where they uniquely explain the to negotiation, and because the maintenance of positive role of affect. That is, relationships will be considered affect is thought to enhance the joint outcomes of nego-in cases where their implications for negotiation protiating parties (Carnevale & Isen, 1986) , much of the cesses are distinct from those arising from other affect analysis that follows focuses on predictions about posi-sources. tive affect. However, we will assume asymmetry and Finally, there is a dispositional perspective within hence offer hypotheses about negative affect in cases which positive and negative affect are treated as stable when a specific type of negative affect (e.g., anger, con-facets of individual personality (Watson & Clark, 1984;  tentiousness) is indicated and when there exists a di- Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) . Individuals who exrect conceptual or empirical basis to do so.
perience feelings such as discomfort, anger, sadness, and negative mood across situations are said to exhibit Conceptualizing Affect high levels of negative affectivity. Positive affectivity is the tendency to experience positive emotional states, Precise psychological definitions of and distinctions such as pleasure or well-being, over time and across among such constructs as affect, feeling, mood, and situations (Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991) . It has been aremotion are elusive (Forgas, 1992) , and many researchgued that dispositional affect accounts in important ers manage the subtleties by using the terms interways for the existence and direction of social attitudes. changeably. Others draw distinctions among different Staw, Bell, and Clausen (1986) , for example, found that forms of affect, most commonly in terms of the pervadispositional affect predicts job attitudes over a period siveness and specificity of affective states (Moore & of years. As measured by structured self-report instru- Isen, 1990 ). For example, affect is said to be differentiments (Watson et al., 1988) , positive and negative afated or discrete (Izard, 1991; Park et al., 1986) when fectivity are generally treated as orthogonal, or perit takes the form of feelings or emotions that are relahaps discrete, dimensions of personality, not as oppotively intense, ephemeral, and have a discernable antesite poles on a single continuum (George, 1990; cedent cause (Forgas, 1992; Mayer & Salovey, 1988) . Affect that is undifferentiated (Park et al., 1986) , also Watson & Tellegen, 1985) . In considering the role of affect in negotiation, we making within which negotiators work from cognitive and perceptual interpretations of the dispute situation neither prefer nor reject any one particular conceptualization of affect. Consistent with recent social psycho- (Neale & Bazerman, 1991, p. 7) . The affect literature yields a multiplicity of effects that potentially speak logical work on negotiator cognition, we treat the negotiation encounter as a context for multiparty decision to the social-cognitive underpinnings of this context. There is evidence, for instance, that affective states Thus, our focus in this paper is on developing a framework for understanding how generalized affect and processes influence creativity in problem solving (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987) , cognitive organiza-states work in tandem with these kinds of cognitive processes as both antecedents and consequences to extion and categorization (Isen & Daubman, 1984) , information encoding and retrieval , cooperative plain negotiation behavior. The framework we propose in the next section of the paper takes as its context and helping behavior (Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Levin & Isen, 1975) , problem-solving strategies (Isen, Means, the two-party negotiation encounter. While restricting discussion to the two-party case may be viewed as a Patrick, & Nowicki, 1982) , perceptions of self-efficacy ( Baron, 1990) , risk-taking behavior (Isen & Patrick, limitation , it provides a basis for extended work and is consistent with current research on the social psychol-1983; Johnson & Tversky, 1983) , utility functions and equity norms (Loewenstein et al., 1989) , and levels of ogy of negotiation. At certain points, we hypothesize source-contingent effects where the influence of affect aggression (Baron, 1978) .
varies with the specific antecedent origins of feeling Affect versus Cognition states. We will argue, for example, that the role of affect Generally, laboratory studies have not pitted affect sometimes varies depending on whether affect states against cognition in the prediction of thoughts and be-arise from prior relationships between the parties or havior. As a result, it is not known whether affect con-other causes. For the most part, however, we deemphatributes to explained variance beyond the more cogni-size sources and types of affective responses, treating tive explanations available to researchers. Some evi-affect globally as a generic arousal state encompassing dence for their relative influence can be found in moods and emotions (Forgas, 1992 ) that bargainers studies within applied domains that investigated affect bring to and evolve within the negotiation encounter. and cognition simultaneously. In Table 1 , we summarize relevant studies we discovered in the areas of con-
THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN TWO-PARTY
sumer emotions, quality of life concerns, and workplace NEGOTIATION environments. With very few exceptions, all variance estimates and coefficients reported in the table were
In Fig. 1 we present a general framework of the role significant.
of affect in negotiation that charts the territory we will Within the table, we distinguish between analyses cover below. The negotiation encounter is depicted as of the independent effects of affect and cognition (first an ordered series of cognitive and behavioral stages in two columns of coefficients), and simultaneous analy-which bargainers progress from an initial decision to ses that address their relative effects (last three col-enter a negotiation through the processes of formulatumns of coefficients). The second is more telling as it ing expectations, implementing strategies, evaluating addresses the competitive influences of affect vs cogni-outcomes, and ultimately implementing a settlement, tion on a joint basis. Typically, studies report one or should one be reached. Although two-party negotiation the other. The consumer studies are more complete in is a dyadic process, the model in Fig. 1 adopts the perthis regard.
spective of the individual negotiator as its unit and In terms of independent effects, the affect propor-level of analysis. An overarching assumption is that tions are either similar to those of cognition or are mod-affective states experienced by individuals influence estly lower in the consumer and workplace domains. (and in some cases are influenced by) negotiation beIn the quality of life area, cognition did impact the havior in diverse ways at different stages of the process. criteria to a greater degree by a factor of two, although These stages are illustrated in the figure and consist the affect estimates were significant. With respect to of prenegotiation orientation, the process of negotiation joint influences, the effects of cognition tended to be itself, outcome realization, and implementation/future greater than either positive or negative affect taken behavior. singularly, but not when the combined affect influences were considered. Generally, positive affect facilitated, Predisposing Conditions and negative affect hindered, attainment of the criterion. In two findings from a study where a single bipoIn keeping with our earlier discussion of the variety of forms and sources of affect, levels of positive or negalar affect scale was used (Judge & Hulin, 1993) , the affect coefficients were higher. One can conclude, then, tive affect experienced by negotiators are presumed to be the product of multiple antecedents. First, both the that affect is a potent influence on various behaviors throughout a number of domains and is a necessary valence and intensity of episode-relevant affect is expected to vary with a negotiator's measured level of ingredient in a fuller explanation of thoughts and behaviors that have traditionally been investigated as dispositional affect (Watson et al., 1988) . A second class of antecedents encompasses aspects of the physical setcognitive phenomena.
FIG. 1. Model of the Role of Affect in Dyadic Negotiation
ting within which negotiations occur. Sometimes rePrior experience at the negotiating table with a particular opponent is especially relevant: Oliver et al. ferred to as environmentally induced affect (e.g., Baron, 1990) , the degree to which an ambient setting (1994) found that satisfaction with a negotiated settlement is positively associated with the desire for future for behavior is pleasing or discomforting contributes to levels of experienced affect. Third, as manipulations interaction with the same opponent, and Lawler and Yoon (1992) reported that frequent exchange fosters using humorous and/or grim films and texts incorporated within numerous experimental studies amply positive affect which, in turn, yields an affective commitment to the exchange. Thus, favorable past experidemonstrate, affective states can be generated by events experienced immediately prior to the behavioral ence with an opponent is predicted to enhance positive affect, and unfavorable prior experiences should enencounter of interest (e.g., Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Isen & Daubman, 1984) .
hance negative affect. Pre-negotiation influences are shown within Fig. 1 Most importantly, however, affect is presumed to be a function of prior perceptions and experiences negotia-as resulting in an initial level of affect, Affect 1 , which can be viewed as an anticipation. Anticipations have tors bring to a particular encounter. Examples include a negotiator's reactions to previous negotiation encoun-the property of motivating actions in accord with the particular affective orientation (i.e., positive or negaters (Oliver, Balakrishnan, & Barry, 1994) , interpersonal ties with an opponent (Druckman & Broome, tive) embedded in the anticipatory state. This may result in a set of preliminary decisions regarding further 1991), perceptions that one's opponent acted deceptively in a prior encounter (Shapiro & Bies, 1994) , or negotiation behavior, as discussed below.
With respect to prenegotiation influences: other elements of an existing interpersonal relationship (Polzer, Neale, & Glenn, 1993; Sondak & Moore, P1. An individual negotiator's level of positive affect at the 1993). Interpersonal attractiveness arising from interstart of the negotiation encounter is a positive function of personal similarity (e.g., Byrne, 1971 ) may also contribperceptions that his/her opponent is attitudinally or demoute to the formation of positive prenegotiation affect. ences, and background characteristics (Cialdini, 1993) .
Preliminaries: Deciding to Negotiate, Selecting an
mise than on problem solving or collaboration (e.g., Fry, Firestone, & Williams, 1983) . In such cases, parties Opponent, Forming Expectations may view the risk to the relationship as a threat of The negotiation decision. A negotiation encounter meaningful losses, and hence be less inclined to select begins, theoretically, with decisions regarding whether negotiation over other, less contentious options that or not and with whom to negotiate, although in some might be available. cases these questions are rendered essentially moot by Separately, we propose a role for negative affect in the constraints of the context. In a supplier-buyer rela-the decision-to-negotiate equation. The foundation for tionship, for example, bilateral negotiation may func-this argument is the notion of aggression: Negative tion as a default mechanism for reaching a contractual affect has been associated with aggressive behavior in agreement, and the choice of a particular individual a curvilinear fashion, with the highest levels of aggresopponent may be out of the negotiator's control. Beyond sion are engendered by moderate levels of negative afcontextual constraints, the decision to negotiate may fect (Bell & Baron, 1990) . Aggression as the basis for also be preordained by forces that are cognitive in na-a decision to negotiate is relevant when potential barture. Consider, for instance, private real estate transac-gainers perceive the option to enter a negotiation as an tions, where the seller and a potential buyer come to-aggressive interpersonal alternative to other forms of gether to seek agreement. Although the option not to conflict management. This is plausible in situations bargain (and instead simply take or leave an initial where bargainers are inclined to engage in contentious asking price) is available, buyers may work from a cog-negotiation behavior, such as when bargainers are acnitive script (Schank & Abelson, 1977) for real estate countable to constituents (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984) , transactions that prominently incorporates the give face time pressures (Carnevale & Lawler, 1986) , perand take of negotiation.
ceive the situation as a win-lose encounter with diverHowever, in situations where the individual's option gent goals between the parties (Thompson & Hastie, to bargain is not situationally or cognitively con-1990), or are otherwise unconcerned with protecting strained, affect may explain in part how individuals the working relationship between parties (see Pruitt & respond to the option to negotiate. Empirically, there Carnevale, 1993) . On the other hand, there are situais evidence that positive affect enhances people's will-tions where the alternative to bargaining may be the ingness to initiate conversations (Batson, Coke, Chard, aggressive choice, such as when an interactant enterSmith, & Taliaferro, 1979), to take moderate risks tains the option of simply forcing outcomes on the other (Isen & Patrick, 1983) , and to prefer collaboration over party in dictatorial fashion. Accordingly, based on the avoidance as a means to resolve conflict (Baron, 1984) . curvilinear affect-aggression relationship, we propose Later studies, however, indicate that the relationship that negative affect experienced in moderate amounts between positive affect and risk taking depends on will make the choice to negotiate more likely when neone's perception of the severity of potential losses (e.g., gotiation is viewed as the aggressive conflict resolution Isen, Nygren, & Ashby, 1988) . Specifically, individuals option. experiencing positive affect who face the prospect of To summarize, with respect to the decision to negotimeaningful loss tend to be risk-averse, while individu-ate: als experiencing positive affect who perceive limited P3. Positive affect elevates the likelihood that an individual will loss magnitudes (even if the risk of losing is high) are choose negotiation over transaction or disengagement. This linknot necessarily risk averse and may even be risk-prone age is moderated by (a) perceptions of potential losses, and (b) (Arkes, Herren, & Isen, 1988) . Thus, we predict that the value placed on relational maintenance: positive affect increases the likelihood that negotiation P3a. Positive affect increases the likelihood that negotiation will be preferred to simple transaction or disenwill be preferred when judgments of the negative subjective utility of possible losses are low, rather than high. gagement when interactants perceive that relatively minor potential losses are at stake. On the other hand, P3b. Positive affect increases the likelihood that negotiation will be preferred when the value assigned to relational maintewhen potential losses are experienced as meaningful nance is low, rather than high.
(i.e., a high level of negative subjective utility) and P4. Given a perception that negotiation is the aggressive conflictwhen the option to negotiate is perceived as the risky management option, there is a curvilinear relationship between alternative, then positive affect should attenuate the negative affect and the likelihood that the individuals will choose likelihood that interactants will choose negotiation. Choosing or learning the identity of one's opponent. The selection of a negotiating opponent may also be protecting the relationship through yielding or compro-at the discretion of the individual negotiator. Given benefit being sought) and of the lowest acceptable benesituations where a choice of opponents does exist, the fit; Pruitt (1981) called these judgments the level of role of affect may be analyzed in terms of its effect on aspiration and limit, respectively. More complex forthe process of behavioral decision making. Here re-mulations propose multiple levels of aspiration and search findings lead to seemingly conflicting predic-limit. Tietz and Weber (1978) , for example, argued that tions. On the one hand, programmatic research by Isen negotiators harbor separate aspirations reflecting their and her colleagues suggests that positive affect is asso-first offer (hoped-for best outcome), an optimistic goal, ciated with problem-solving creativity, cognitive flexi-a pessimistic goal, a threatened limit below which one bility, and perspective taking in problem solving (see says he or she will not go, and an actual limit price Isen and Baron, 1991 , for a review). Thus, if selection at which one will actually terminate the negotiation. of an opponent is viewed as a problem-solving task, Rather than dwell on the subtle distinctions among then high-positive-affect negotiators might be expected different conceptualizations of bargainer aspiration, we to make a ''creative'' selection, i.e., to choose an oppo-use the term ''expectations'' to describe the internally nent strategically. An alternative view is to treat the set range that reflects a negotiator's desire for achieveselection decision as an information-processing task in ment (Oliver et al., 1994) . response to stimulus cues. With this perspective, the We presume that negotiator expectations will be conquestion is one of motivation: Do affective states influ-sistent with other predisposing and preliminary cues ence the bargainer's inclination to thoughtfully analyze to the encounter, and that positive affect will generate the selection of an opponent? There is evidence to sug-favorable expectations or optimism regarding the final gest that people experiencing positive affect prefer sim-negotiation outcome. In one of the few published affectplified, heuristically-based information processing negotiation studies, Baron (1990) found that laboratory strategies, while negative affect triggers more elabo-subjects in a positive affect condition started with rated, analytical processing styles (Forgas, 1992) .
higher monetary goals than subjects in a neutral affect Proponents of information-based theories of affect condition. However, the affect manipulation in Baron's (e.g., Schwartz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991) provide a way to study was based solely on environmental inducement reconcile the apparent contradiction between problem-through the introduction of a pleasant scent (positive solving and information-processing interpretations of affect condition) into the laboratory. We question the role of affect. They argue that positive moods signal whether the same effect on prenegotiation aspirations that ''all is well'' in the actor's environment, encourag-would obtain in situations where affect derives from ing effort-minimizing processing and a willingness to other sources. take risks. Presumably, this frees the individual to Indeed, there is empirical evidence suggesting that think in unusual or creative ways; however, we ques-interpersonal ties between negotiators -one source of tion whether the issue of opponent selection is likely prenegotiation affect -influences expectations (see to strike negotiators as a stimulus for creative thought. Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993 , for a review of relationship Indeed, the affirmative link between positive affect and issues in negotiation). Druckman and Broome (1991) self-efficacy ( Baron, 1990) implies that high-positive-found that laboratory subjects instructed to assume a affect negotiators might possess the confidence to disre-positive, friendly relationship with an impending negogard the choice of an opponent as a significant issue tiation opponent reported outcome goals closer to comin enacting a dispute-resolution procedure. Negative promise than subjects instructed to assume a negative, moods, on the other hand, signal the actor that the hostile relationship. In a similar vein, Fry et al. (1983) situation is problematic, encouraging the individual to compared the negotiation perceptions and processes of avoid decisions that would make the situation worse dating couples and stranger dyads. They used verbal (Schwartz et al., 1991) . Thus, given a decision to negoti-process data to infer that dating dyads had lower outate and a choice of opponents: come aspirations. Consistent with those aspirations, dating couples in the actual negotiation were outper-P5. There is a negative (positive) relationship between positive (negative) affect and the likelihood that an individual will select formed by stranger pairs in terms of profit outcomes.
a negotiating opponent strategically.
Fry et al. interpreted their findings by suggesting that concerns for relational maintenance attenuate the aspirations of relationally close negotiators. In buyerFormulating expectations. It is widely believed that seller transactions, experimental findings reported by negotiators adopt cognitive reference points that define Halpern (1992) indicate that buyers expect to pay more, expectations and limits within an impending negotiaand sellers to charge less, when dealing with friends tion encounter (e.g., Raiffa, 1982; Walton & McKersie, rather than strangers. These findings suggest the pos-1965). At their simplest, these reference points include a bargainer's assessments of the negotiation goal (the sibility that unlike other sources of affect, relationship-based affect does not necessarily elevate -and may states that are elicited primarily by positive prior experiences with the bargaining opponent are predicted to even attenuate -prenegotiation expectations.
1 Accordingly, we propose that affect source moderates the rela-result in the adoption of less extreme initial offers than when prior experiences are neutral or negative. On the tionship between positive affect and aspirations, as follows:
other hand, positive affect states engendered by forces unrelated to the dyadic relationship (setting, proximate P6. The relationship between positive affect generated by predisevents, disposition) lead to higher expectations and posing conditions and expectations of the eventual outcome of confidence levels regarding the realization of self-interthe negotiation process depends on the source of that affect:
est and hence more extreme initial offers.
P6a. Positive affect stemming from the relationship between Thus, the parties is negatively associated with an individual's expecta-P7. The relationship between a negotiator's positive affect and tions regarding the economic value of his/her own negotiated the initial offer made by that negotiator depends on the source outcomes.
of that affect: P6b. Positive affect that is dispositional or related to features P7a. Positive affect stemming from a bargainer's personal reof the bargaining setting is positively associated with an individlationship with his/her opponent is negatively associated with ual's expectations regarding the economic value of his/her own the profitability of that bargainer's initial offer. negotiated outcomes.
P7b. Positive affect that is not a consequence of the interpersonal relationship between negotiators, i.e., affect that is disposi- 
Affect in the Negotiation

Initial offers. The question here is whether positive
Tactical behavior. Affect states influence choices and/or negative affect states, through the mediating actors make among available behavioral options presence of expectations or otherwise, induce negotia- (Moore & Isen, p. 11) , and hence are fundamentally tors to formulate initial offers that are higher or lower relevant to an understanding of the tactics negotiators than they would be given a neutral affect state. We employ. One way to define tactical behavior is in terms find that the literature has not examined in detail the of a bargainer's motivational orientation (Pruitt, 1981) , linkage between negotiation outcome expectations and which in its most parsimonious form entails a distinctheir translation into initial offers. One recent study of tion between competition and cooperation (Deutsch, a simple distributive bargaining task reported zero-1973). Bargainers with a competitive orientation operorder correlations between prenegotiation aspirations ate out of concern primarily for their own outcomes. and initial offers of between .59 and .68 (Barry & FriedBargainers with a cooperative orientation make behavman, 1996). Thus, it is likely that the size of an opening ioral choices that reflect a concern for both their own offer reflects a negotiator's perceptions not only of the and their opponents' outcomes. In tactical terms, comvalue of the opponent's limit, or walk-away price, in petitive bargainers try to persuade their opponents to relation to one's own (Lax & Sebenius, 1986) , but also make concessions, while cooperative bargainers engage of goals for individual utility.
in problem-solving behavior as a way to satisfy both This implies that expectations are determinants of parties' interests (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986) . the magnitude of first offers, with negotiators translatFive experimental studies included direct tests of the ing high (low) expectations into high (low) initial offers.
influence of positive affect on the selection of negotiaAccordingly, in line with our previous analysis of expection tactics. Laboratory subjects in a study by Carnetations, we surmise that affect source is relevant as a vale and Isen (1986) either were or were not exposed contingency factor. When affect is the result of positive to a positive-affect inducing manipulation (viewing hurelational ties, negotiators should be more cognizant of morous cartoons and receiving a small gift) just prior the other party's concerns and less motivated to use to engaging in a bilateral monopoly negotiation task. extreme offers to advance self-interest. Hence, affect Using verbal process measures gleaned from contentanalyzed tape recordings of the negotiations, Carne- It is conceivable, however, that positive affect induces individuals to treat others as if they were more relationally close. There is evidence 2 The Carnevale and Isen (1986) experimental design crossed the that positive feeling states enhance judgments of interpersonal attractiveness (Gouaux, 1971 ), but we are unaware of research examinpresence vs. absence of positive affect with a manipulation of visual access: Some subjects bargained face-to-face and others bargained ing the direct link between transient affect and the development of friendship ties. We thank an anonymous OBHDP reviewer for while separated by a visual barrier. The negative relationship between positive affect and contentious tactics was a main-effects findsuggesting this possibility. result was replicated in an experiment by Hollingshead and problem-solving behavior, some researchers have explored more specific communication behaviors within and Carnevale (1990) : Subjects who received a small gift prior to negotiation (positive affect condition) made negotiation that assume tactical forms. Weingart, Bennett, and Brett (1993) synthesized prior literature to more concessions and integrative offers than subjects who received no give gift (neutral affect condition). In develop a tactical coding scheme for negotiation that includes 13 categories of behavior. Several of the his study of positive affect induced environmentally via the presence or absence of a pleasant scent, Baron Weingart et al. categories are consistent with strategies that characterize problem-solving (see Pruitt & Car-(1990) found that high-affect subjects made slightly more concessions than neutral-affect subjects. Druck-nevale, 1993 ), and we propose that positive affect enhances the likelihood that negotiators will display man and Broome (1991) used variations in scenario descriptions to manipulate familiarity with and liking these behaviors. Thus, we hypothesize the positive-affect negotiators are more likely than neutral-affect nefor an opponent in an international dispute resolution task. They found that bargainers were more flexible gotiators to make multi-issue offers, communicate understanding of the other parties' positions and prioriand more willing to reach compromise agreements when negotiating with an opponent they knew and ties, ask questions, and express mutuality of concerns. et al., 1993; also see Pruitt, 1981) , as well as with socialcognitive work showing that positive affect promotes helping behavior (Batson, 1990; Batson et al., 1979) Experienced affect. Apart from the influence of preand creative problem-solving . Taken negotiation affect (Affect 1 ) on tactics, we also propose together, they corroborate the proposition that positive in Fig. 1 that experienced affect, Affect 2 , will itself be affect yields cooperative bargaining behavior across af-influenced by the tactical exchange that actually does fect sources (although we know of no research that has occur. There is evidence that cooperative behavior elicexamined dispositional affect in this regard). Concur-its interpersonal trust (Weingart et al. 1993) , which rent support for the obverse proposition-that nega-may in turn be construed as a component of interpertive affect increases contentious behavior-is more sonal affect (e.g., Tsui & Barry, 1986) . However, we are tenuous since two of the three studies ( Baron, 1990 ; not convinced that the mere presence (or absence) of Carnevale & Isen, 1986) contrasted positive with neu-problem-solving behavior within a bargaining encountral affect.
3 Given a lack of convincing evidence that ter will evoke affective consequences. We argue, innegative affect reduces cooperativeness, and given the stead, that the particular tactical forms within an complex, contingent relationship between negative af-encounter will generate affect on the basis of prior exfect and helping behavior (Batson, 1990) , we refrain pectations about one's opponent's motivational orientafrom making a general prediction about the association tion. Oliver et al. (1994) demonstrated that affective between negative affect and bargaining tactics. responses to negotiation outcomes (i.e., negotiator satBeyond the basic distinction between competitive isfaction) are a function of the extent to which prior expectations about those outcomes are surpassed, met, or not attained. From a broader communication theory ing, but the positive relationship between affect and problem-solving behavior emerged only in the visual-access condition. However, as perspective, Burgoon and Le Poire (1993) found that ner's character, competence, and attractiveness. Thus, dislike-implying negative rather than neutral affect -in the scenario description used in their low-liking manipulation. However, we predict that a negotiator's positive affect is enthey did not employ a full-factorial design which would allow us to hanced when expectations that an opponent will be disentangle the effects of liking from those of familiarity, and the contentious are violated through the opponent's use of authors did concede that the effects of the two are distinct. Thus, we cooperative tactics. Conversely, positive affect should treat the Druckman and Broome study as inconclusive with respect to negative affect.
be attenuated when expectations of cooperativeness are violated through the opponent's use of contentious In general contexts, improving circumstances resulted in improved emotional states while degenerating situatactics. 4 tions resulted in greater emotional negativity (e.g.,
P10
. Tactics influence experienced affect through a process of Diener, Larsen, Levine, & Emmons, 1985; Dubé , expectancy (dis)confirmation: Positive affect is enhanced when Schmitt, & Leclerc, 1991; Eliashberg & Sawhney, 1994;  a negotiator anticipates a contentious opponent but encounters cooperative behavior; positive affect is diminished when a negoti- Marco & Sulls, 1993; Watson, 1988) . However, when ator anticipates a cooperative opponent but encounters contenindividuals were motivated to effect their mood, either tious behavior.
because of self-presentation or of self-control to achieve a goal, moods were less susceptible to changes in outNote, as also shown in Fig. 1 , that the affect genercomes or the behavior of others (e.g., Ganesan, 1993; ated during the process of negotiation (Affect 2 ) should Greenhalgh & Gilkey, 1993; Lawler & Yoon, 1993 ; serve to influence tactics and concessions later in the Polzer et al., 1993; Sondak & Moore, 1993) . process. In turn, changes in tactics and the resulting Generally, this latter finding may be more pervasive changes in experience within the negotiation process in negotiation settings for two reasons. First, profeswill serve further to influence both: (a) the negotiator's sional negotiators may possess the ability to control expectations of the opponent's behavior and the settlemomentary emotions if they believe that, for example, ment outcome, and (b) the attendant affect states (Af-''putting on a happy face'' will further their cause. We fect 2 ). This raises issues of expectation updating and would not rule out the effectance of negative emotions, affect shifts. such as anger, for the same reason. Second, later A reasonable assumption in negotiation sessions is phases of bargaining sessions should be closer to settlethat expectation levels ebb and flow as the parties ment as issues are resolved. This growing reduction of make offers which are challenged and rebuffed and as uncertainty should have the effect of increasing posipoints of contention are won or conceded. A corollary tive moods and reducing negative states, particularly is that the emotions accompanying these changes in if the impending settlement is satisfactory. (This issue position will also vary. This raises the issue of the dyis separate from that of affect related to the final agreenamics of expectations as the negotiation unfolds. In ment per se, relating only to uncertainty reduction.) particular, will initial or updated expectations be used
Research has shown that uncertainty reduction in comparison to outcomes? A related question is to through the mechanism of relieving apprehension is a what extent the parties ''blend'' initial with revised exconsistent contributor to positive affect and the moderpectations.
ation of negative affect . Data are scant on these questions. While intuition Thus, would suggest that expectations are most assuredly updated during prolonged interpersonal encounters, P11. Initial expectations will be amended to the extent that they are disconfirmed: Negative violations of expectancies will lower only three studies which bear on this observation were such expectations as the negotiation proceeds, while positive found. In Szajna and Scamell (1993) , an experimental violations will raise expectations. manipulation of computer system user experience over three time periods was conducted; in Zwick, Pieters, P12. As the negotiation proceeds, affect shifts result from (a) positively or negatively disconfirming information about probaand Baumgartner (1995), subjects were provided with ble outcomes, (b) perceptions that the negotiator is able to control prior information and actual performance of a mock-up affective experience, and (c) changes in perceptions of uncerconsumer product; while in Ortinau and Bush (1987) , tainty as issue resolution becomes more (or less) likely. students were tracked at three times over the course of a semester regarding their grade. The results were consistent over the three studies. Expectations tracked Affect Related to Settlements and Outcomes the subject's experience in a predictable fashion. Poor Following , our treatment of negotiinterim performance lowered expectations while excepation outcomes distinguishes between economic outtional performance raised them.
comes addressing the allocation of material resources More work was found on the updating of emotions.
at issue within a bargaining context, and social-psychological outcomes that speak to the cognitive and percep- foregoing discussion of tactical behavior within the barthat is perceived to be unethical as contentious. If such behavior is gaining encounter, we emphasized the distinction beunexpected, it is more likely to trigger an affective reaction than if tween contentious and cooperative behavior. In thinkthe negotiator has reason to anticipate that the opponent will behave this way.
ing about settlements, however, it is important to note that cooperative behavior may or may not lead to inte-when the source of experienced positive affect is dispositional or situational, rather than relational. grative solutions that maximize the outcomes of both negotiating parties (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986) . From the P13. Positive affect that is experienced by both parties increases perspective of the dual concerns model (e.g., Filley, the level of joint economic outcomes in a negotiated settlement.
1975; Rahim, 1983) , parties will work toward agreeAffect source moderates this linkage: ments that compromise their positions when they P13a. The linkage is weak when the major sources of negotiashare moderate levels of concern for both their own and tor affect are relationship-based. the other person's interests. When parties share high P13b. The linkage is stronger when the major sources of negolevels of concern for both self and other, they are more tiator affect are dispositional or related to features of the barlikely to reach agreements that integrate their underlygaining setting other than inter-bargainer relationship.
ing interests and maximize joint outcomes. With reUnexplored in the literature are conditions of affect spect to economic outcomes, then, the principal quesasymmetry, such as when one negotiator experiences tion at issue is how the presence or absence of affect positive affect and the other experiences negative affect influences joint outcomes in the bargaining dyad.
at the conclusion of the negotiation. Based on the reCarnevale and Isen (1986) examined this issue disults of a study of commercial litigation (Kaufmann & rectly in their study using a proximate-event induce- Stern, 1988 ), it appears that the negative party will ment of affect (humorous cartoon and a gift), finding continue to harbor ill-feelings, particularly if these are that positive-affect negotiating pairs reached signifiattributed to unfair dealings, exploitation, or deception cantly higher joint-profit agreements than neutral-afon the part of the more content party (Ben-Zur & Brezfect negotiators. This result is consistent with evidence nitz, 1991; Russell & McAuley, 1986; Snell, McDonthat & Koch, 1991) . This level of ''retained hostility'' and concession making (Baron, 1990) will most likely be exhibited in avoidance, retribution, and reduces aggression (Baron, 1984) . Less consistent, or dissembling in future potential negotiation encounhowever, is the outcome reported by Fry et al. (1983) ters. This issue also pertains to the following issue of in their study of negotiation within dating and stranger affect as a consequence of outcomes. couples. Fry et al. found a negative relationship between joint profit and couple involvement. Thus, there
Affect as a consequence of economic outcomes: socialis evidence that positive affect does not always produce psychological outcomes. We argue that the outcomes higher joint benefits in negotiation.
obtained by the individual negotiator will, in turn, inTaken together, the Carnevale and Isen (1986) and fluence post-negotiation levels of positive affect, AfFry et al. (1983) findings suggest that the influence of fect 3 , as a consequence of the encounter. As with tactiaffect on economic outcomes may depend on the source cal effects discussed earlier, we frame our prediction in of that affect. Earlier we proposed a role for affect terms of an expectancy disconfirmation interpretation source in connection with prenegotiation expectations: (Oliver, 1980; Oliver et al., 1994) . Specifically, positive We argued that expectations rise or fall depending on affect is increased to the extent that negotiators whether or not affect is related to one's interpersonal achieve outcomes that exceed expectations, and is direlationship with the bargaining opponent. Research minished by outcomes that fail to meet prior expectaindicates that higher expectations may facilitate inte-tions. Consistent with the experimental finding of Oligrative solutions by motivating bargainers to look be-ver et al. (1994) , we further expect that post-settlement yond simple compromise alternatives (Pruitt, 1981) . By levels of affect lead to perceptions of greater satisfacthis logic, the same sources of positive affect that yield tion and an increased desire for future interaction with high aspirations would be expected to increase the this particular bargaining opponent. Thus, as depicted value of joint outcomes. However, since high joint out-in the general framework in Fig. 1 , we propose that comes require a commitment by both parties to achiev-affect state changes mediate the linkage between ecoing an integrative solution, this will hold true only if nomic and perceptual outcomes. both parties experience similar affect states. We pro-
The mechanism for this mediation is available from pose, therefore, that under conditions of affect symme-Weiner's (1985; Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 1979) try (both parties experiencing similar affect states), af-work. He proposed two affective sequences leading to fect source moderates a positive relationship between outcomes, one based on the goal-relevance of the outexperienced positive affect and negotiated joint eco-come to the subject -referred to as outcome dependent nomic outomes. Joint outcomes are affected minimally, affect, and one resulting from causal ascriptions (attriif at all, when negotiators experience positive affect butions) for the outcome-referred to as attribution arising from a favorable relationship with their oppo-dependent affect. The first sequence is known as primary appraisal, the latter as secondary appraisal. nent. Joint outcomes are influenced more strongly The expectancy disconfirmation process is thought while failure attributed to contentiousness may very well result in anger. More egregious partner behavior, to be responsible for both affect sequences, first as a mechanism for assessing the goal-relevance of the out-such as deception, may result in hostility which, as we propose, will be retained in the next round, should it come through the met-surpassed-unattained expectations judgment, and secondly, as an instigator of attri-occur.
To summarize our predictions regarding post-negotibutional search for the cause of the outcome (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1981; Wong & Weiner, 1981) . ation affect: Depending on a number of factors, including the degree P14. Post-negotiation positive affect increases with economic setto which the outcome is favorable or unfavorable, and tlements that exceed aspirations, and is diminished by economic whether it is thought to result primarily from personal settlements that fall short of expectations.
talents/failings or from the cooperative/contentious ac- mary appraisal to elicit negotiator satisfaction (cf. Oliver, 1989 Oliver, , 1993 as well as the summary affective tone Post-settlement Implementation brought to the next stage of the negotiation process, i.e., future behavior including compliance. Gray (1989, pp. 92-93) noted that collaborative agreements in conflict resolution are particularly susThe specifics of this process are shown in Table 2 . In the first column, the negotiation outcome is regarded ceptible to collapse during the post-settlement period where parties are obliged to implement the terms of as a success or failure with their attendant outcomedependent affects of happiness and disappointment/ a negotiated agreement. She cited value conflict and mistrust as examples of the kinds of inter-party dysadness. The second column portrays the perceived attribution of responsibility as either due to oneself or to namics that may undermine compliance with the terms of a settlement. We know of no empirical research in the partner. The third column describes some likely causes of these attributions in negotiation settings. For the social psychology of negotiation that has explicitly addressed post-settlement compliance. Evidence of example, under success one can feel competent and/or stealthy and perceive the partner as cooperative and/ post-transaction results in sales relationships does suggest, however, that trust and satisfaction are instruor fair. Under failure, one can feel incompetent and/ or overwhelmed while the partner may be viewed as mental in maintaining future interaction (Crosby, Evans, & Cowles, 1990) . We believe, similarly, that afcontentious and/or unethical.
The last column displays likely attribution-depen-fective outcomes of the bargaining encounter will create the conditions for effective or ineffective impledent affects emerging from these attribution judgments. To illustrate, a common affect resulting from mentation.
As shown in Fig. 1 , we also believe that the outcomes success due to skill is pride, while failure due to perceived lack of ability may result in guilt or shame or achieved and the resulting generalized affect will play a role in the implementation process. Studies in perboth. A common affect resulting from successes attributed to the partner's cooperativeness is appreciation, ceived justice, particularly in the case of taxation com-pliance and evasion, show that the judged fairness of experimenters to consider a wider range of recruitment strategies that would import relationships, rather than outcomes and correlated affect are instrumental in gaining compliance (Kaplan, Reckers, & Reynolds, simply individuals, into the subject pool. A recent example is a study by Thompson, Peterson, and Brodt 1986; Porcano, 1988) . Thus, our predictions regarding this stage of the negotiation process appear as follows: (1996) , which addressed the role of intrateam friendships in interteam negotiation. . As O'Connor and Rhoades (1995) observed, although this can be effective at inducing positive affect Our aim in this paper was to introduce a framework (Isen & Daubman, 1984) , it is problematic in negotiadescribing the role of affect states in various stages of tion if it elicits a norm of reciprocity that would cona negotiation encounter. The underlying motivation for found effects on concession behavior. In general, exterthis effort lies in the frequently expressed observation nal validity concerns argue for observation over manipthat the topic of affect in bargaining is both important ulatation in testing predictions regarding situational and underexplored (e.g., Neale & Bazerman, 1991; affect, although this is likely to make detecting effects Neale & Northcraft, 1991; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993) . more difficult, thereby increasing the risk of Type II We should note, however, that many of the predictions errors. we have generated rely on the tacit assumption that
Empirical tests of the model developed in this paper connections between affect and cognition found typi-are probably best undertaken in stages. Initially, recally in basic laboratory studies of social cognition can searchers should examine the impact of affect on spebe applied to the negotiation context. As affect re-cific behavioral components of the negotiation process. searchers caution, this is a conceptual step one must This can be accomplished through manageable bemake carefully, since many affect-cognition links are tween-subjects experimental designs that treat decicontext-specific and not appropriately generalized to be sions to negotiate, expectations, offers, and tactics as a wider explanation of social behavior (Moore & Isen, dependent variables. By combining pencil and paper 1990, p. 12) .
measures of dispositional affect, subject-recruitment The methodological issues raised by our analysis of strategies that inject relationships into sampling affect in negotiation are far from trivial. Propositions frames, and (careful) inductions of situational affect, it addressing how affect within the encounter influences is possible to examine how affect-behavior relationand is influenced by negotiation behavior are testable ships vary with affect source. through the inclusion of affect measures in intra-and Ultimately, given that affect processes in negotiation post-negotiation data collection. Empirical study of re-are dynamic, tests of the model will require longitudilationship-based affect in negotiation, on the other nal investigation. Although a single study of the entire hand, poses a different methodological challenge. Argu-model is unlikely, an investigation of its dynamic naably, affect in bargaining is underexplored in large ture requires attention to the processes of expectation measure because the dominant laboratory paradigm updating and affect shifts. To get at these processes in used to study the social psychology of dyadic negotia-the laboratory, within-subjects designs are approtion is decontextualized (Barley, 1990) . Investigating priate. In the field or in a negotiation simulation, multirelationship-based affect requires the availability of on-ple measurements at different time periods will be necgoing relationships that comprise the social context for essary. Of course, both approaches impose measurea bargaining encounter, as well as strategies for mea-ment artifact on the data, an issue which may require suring those relationships (e.g., Greenhalgh & Chap-separate study in and of itself. man, 1993). With few exceptions (e.g., the Fry et al., 1983 , study of dating couples), lab studies have typi-Future Directions cally employed stranger dyads recruited as individual participants. If the situational control of the laboratory In developing some of the research propositions in this paper, we argued that the role of affect varies demethod is desirable, then it may be appropriate for pending on the source of a particular affect state. At a or only partially fulfilled, or nearly so. Subsequent interaction should be analyzed both in terms of willingconceptual level, this helps to resolve seemingly conness and in terms of the degree to which opportunities flicting evidence that results from different experimenare made and carried through to fulfillment. The detal manipulations of affect. Certainly, more focused emgree to which outcomes are embraced by the negotiapirical work is needed to examine the verity of these tors' constituencies (i.e., accepted as being represented source-contingent predictions. Corroboration would by their interests) is still another post-outcome afraise a new set of questions about the complementary fective event which resides in the context proposed and compensatory effects of multiple affect sources in here. Such ''third-party'' reactions may well be instrudyadic interaction. For example, what are the implicamental in future theories of negotiation efficacy. tions when negotiators high in dispositional negative affect bargain with relationally close opponents? Do environmental inducements of affect have distinct ef-
